Mobilization for Operation Desert Shield/Storm : lessons learned / by Ronald P. Dale.
Associated Name: Army War College (U.S.)
Publication year: 1992.
Call Number AD-A 251 205
Media class: eBook
Publisher: Carlisle Barracks, PA : U.S. Army War College
Also issued as a Personal experience monograph.
Series title: USAWC Military Studies Program paper ; Student papers
Additional information: iii, 39, p. ; 28 cm.
Total no. of loans: 0
Loans this year: 0
No. of reservations: 0
Iraqi armored and mechanized divisions crossed the border of its neighbor, Kuwait, early on the morning of 2 August 1990. Within twenty-four hours of its successful attack on Kuwait, Iraq was massing its forces on the border of Saudi Arabia, preparing for what appeared to be an immediate attack. Saudi Arabia, requested assistance from the United States. In a quick response, the first elements of the 82nd Airborne Division arrived in Southwest Asia on 8 August. This was the beginning of Operation Desert Shield/Storm. Within three weeks of the attack on Kuwait, the United States realized that it could not go to war without calling on some Reserve Component Forces. The President thus authorized the activation of 200,000 Selected Reserves under the provisions of Title 10, United States Code 673b. This was the first activation of Reserve Forces since the TET offensive in Vietnam in 1968. It was also the first test of General Abrams' Total Force Concept. This study will discuss the historical perspective of United States mobilization policy from its origins to the Total Force Concept. Using the lessons learned in Operation Desert Shield/Storm, it will also discuss the need to change Presidential Authority and mobilization plans to call up Reserve Forces that support an evolving national military strategy requiring rapid deployment, lethal and flexible response.
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